On July 30, 2021, U.S. Defense Secretary Austin, who had just completed a three-country visit to Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines, boarded a special flight for his return trip.

Before his departure, he posted on social media, “On the return flight, I will reflect on the days of productive discussions with partners and friends …… America’s allies and friends are our assets, but I will not take them for granted.”

According to an analysis by the Diplomatic Intelligencer, Southeast Asia has not been a priority for the Biden administration for some time, despite its location at the center of the “Indo-Pacific”. Austin’s visit, the second by a senior member of the Biden administration to Southeast Asia after Sherman’s visit in May, “was clearly intended to allay fears of U.S. alienation from the region.”

“Appease, Draw and Provoke”

On July 27, 2021, U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin delivered the keynote address at the Fullerton Lecture in Singapore, invited by the U.K.’s International Institute for Strategic Studies, on the topic of “The Partnership Imperative.

Before retiring from the military, Austin had a 40-year-long military career.

“As a soldier, both in times of peace and war, I learned a central lesson: no one can operate alone, and even when they do, it doesn’t last.” Austin said the purpose of his trip to Southeast Asia is to deepen U.S. ties with allies, and partners. He also declared that “our network of alliances and friendships is an unparalleled strategic asset” and that “when we work together, America and the region are safer and more prosperous.”

Austin cited “vaccine diplomacy” as an effective way to enhance bilateral relations. Austin said the U.S. will donate 500 million vaccinations worldwide in the coming year, with the Indo-Pacific region as a top priority. “These vaccines are free, no strings attached, and that’s what friends are supposed to do.”

In the second half of his speech, Austin turned to the danger of “coercion” and “conflict” facing countries in the region, and that all parties should further strengthen their partnership to ensure their own security. Austin then named China, not without distortion of facts and malicious smears.

On July 29, the Chinese Embassy in Singapore responded that the speech peddled the U.S. “Indo-Pacific strategy” but took China to task.

“On the one hand, it uses the issues of Taiwan and Xinjiang to interfere in China’s internal affairs, and on the other hand, it exaggerates the Chinese threat and provokes relations between China and its neighbors. These statements turn black and white and create falsehoods, and are still aimed at serving the U.S. geopolitical strategy.”

Singapore is the first stop on Austin’s trip to Southeast Asia. Although not a treaty ally of the United States, the two sides also cooperate in numerous defense areas.

On the morning of July 27, Austin arrived at the Prime Minister’s Office in Singapore. Hours later, a joint statement by the U.S. and new defense ministers released by the U.S. Department of Defense showed that Austin thanked Singapore for providing logistical support for U.S. military aircraft and warships and for facilitating the regular rotational deployment of U.S. Littoral Combat Ships and P-8 Poseidon aircraft.

On July 29, 2021, Austin arrived in Hanoi and was received by Vietnamese President Nguyen Xuan Phuc. According to the Vietnam News Agency, the U.S. and Vietnam agreed to continue to promote cooperation based on the original foundation. In addition, the two sides prioritized resolving issues left over from the Vietnam War, as well as improving maritime law enforcement and cooperating to combat the new crown epidemic.

In an interview with Reuters, Gregory Ball, a senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Washington, analyzed that “Vietnam wants to know if the U.S. will continue to maintain military engagement with Vietnam and a military presence in the South China Sea.”

In the Philippines, Austin, for his part, has made new strides in military cooperation with allies.

According to Bloomberg, on the evening of July 29, 2021, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte received the visiting Austin “as a courtesy” and on the 30th, Philippine Defense Secretary Lorenzana and Austin jointly announced to the media the resumption of the Philippine-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement.

“The sense of disappointment is spreading”

The intention of Austin’s visit to “woo” regional countries and sell the “China threat theory” is self-explanatory. But looking back at Biden’s many foreign policies since he came to power, it seems that the gesture of “partnership” with Southeast Asian countries is a bit late.

According to Cutler, deputy director of the Institute for Policy Studies at the Asia Society of the United States, “The United States, in its own so-called ‘Asia policy,’ always thinks of Southeast Asian countries only after the fact.”

In the Trump administration’s Asia-Pacific Strategy Report released in June 2019, “respecting the centrality of ‘ASEAN’ in the Indo-Pacific region” was placed in a key position in the report. After Biden came to power, he not only frequently contacted Japan, India and Australia, and launched the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue”, a once obscure “informal platform”, but also held his first head of state meeting in March this year.

In March 2021, the U.S. invited ASEAN to join the future “dialogue” on the South China Sea and briefly mentioned the partnership with ASEAN in the U.S. Interim National Security Strategy Guide. However, compared to the Trump era, ASEAN is not in the first tier of the Biden administration’s “allies” in the Indo-Pacific strategy.

According to the New York Times, in May 2021, Blinken had planned to hold a video conference with ASEAN. But for technical reasons, the ministers waited for 45 minutes in vain facing a blank screen, and eventually decided to postpone the meeting again.

In a May 2021 article on the website of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, President Biden “has yet to meet such expectations,” despite regional expectations that the Biden administration would strengthen U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia.

On the other hand, the “credit” of the United States is also being tested.

On June 21, the White House announced that “logistical and other challenges” had prevented the delivery of the new crown vaccine, which was supposed to be delivered by the end of June. The delivery was not yet guaranteed on time.

James Crabtree, a researcher at the British International Institute for Strategic Studies, said that the Biden administration’s actions since taking office have “spread a sense of disappointment” among the otherwise well-intentioned Southeast Asian countries, and Austin’s visit may reduce some of that disappointment, but it will not help resolve deeper problems between the two sides.

And an analysis published July 22 by the Lowy Institute for International Policy shows that for many in Southeast Asia, “the set of values and narratives promoted by the United States are even less trustworthy” and that U.S. “democratic values are on the way out” in the region. “.

Each of The Three Countries has its Own Plans

From the feedback of the countries, we can see that Singapore, the Philippines and Vietnam have their own “calculations”.

In an exclusive interview with the BBC in March 2021, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said, “China is Singapore’s largest export market. Like many Asian countries, Singapore’s economy has benefited from China’s rise” and that Singapore would like to see that China’s prosperity is welcomed by other countries and therefore would not fully support either side in the U.S.-China relationship.

In his Fullerton speech on the evening of July 27, Austin recalled the content of the daytime meeting. “Singapore said it did not want to choose between China and the United States.” Austin relayed.

Singapore’s attitude of trying to avoid involvement in major power struggles is related to its long-standing foreign policy of “balance of power”.

“Relying on international resources and balancing the major powers through an ASEAN-based multilateral cooperation framework is Singapore’s basic strategy under the Indo-Pacific framework.” said Fan Yilei, an associate professor at Shandong Youth Political College.

Vietnam is more worried about the insecurity of U.S. policy toward Vietnam than Singapore. Al Jazeera cited expert analysis that “Vietnam’s lingering concerns about Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement in 2017 have limited Vietnam’s relations with the United States.”

At the same time, U.S. accusations of human rights issues in Vietnam have become a key point limiting relations between the two sides.

Austin then mentioned in his speech on July 27 that “wherever we go, we discuss these values with our friends and allies, and we make no secret of that.” In mid-July, Biden’s nominee to be the next U.S. ambassador to Vietnam, Mark Napper, also said the U.S. intends to strengthen its security relationship with Vietnam only if it improves human rights.

Compared to Singapore and Vietnam, the Philippines is more “wavering and unpredictable” in its attitude.

The Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States. But under the Trump administration, there has been an unpleasant “rift. Last January, President Rodrigo Duterte suspended the Troop Access Agreement (TAA) after the U.S. cancelled the visas of Philippine senators to the U.S. for “human rights violations,” and subsequently renewed the suspension three times.

Just a day before Austin’s visit to Southeast Asia, Duterte delivered his last State of the Nation address of his term. In it, he highly praised China: “When the epidemic came, China was the first place I turned to” and “we will take this kindness seriously.”

However, the Troop Access Agreement was reinstated after Austin’s trip to the Philippines. In response, Philippine Defense Secretary Lorenzana said at a press conference, “The decision was made after Duterte met with Austin Thursday night.”

He said he was “not sure why Duterte would change his mind.”

Meanwhile, Duterte’s term will end at the end of June next year.

According to Robin Garcia, assistant professor of political economy at the Asia Pacific University of the Philippines, Duterte’s current pro-China policy is intended to get China’s help in economic construction, and this economic pragmatism “will be highly appreciated in the upcoming elections.

“Even though they have concerns about China’s growing influence, Southeast Asian governments still see China as a potential partner.” An article in The Diplomatic Intelligencer commented that in the post-epidemic era, China is playing an integral role in the region’s public health and economic recovery, and “there is no reason for them to shy away from the benefits of trade and economic interaction.”